Public participation in PSR related to its nature and purpose, responsibilities and national regulatory frameworks
The periodic safety reviews (PSR) are performed for different purposes, but always with the aim to continuously ensure and improve the safety of nuclear power plants (NPP). A PSR is always performed by the licensee. The review of a PSR is part of the regular oversight task of the Regulatory Bodies (RB) and, as for other oversight activities, in most countries does not involve public participation by itself. However, public participation is appropriate in some of the decision-making procedures of the RB, for instance in the case where license conditions are issued or regulations are changed following a PSR review. Because of the differing purposes of the PSR and the different roles of the PSR in national regulatory frameworks, public participation will need to be implemented in a way that fits national legal boundary conditions.
Considerations
Responsibility for safety and PSR
The prime responsibility for nuclear safety lies with the licensee, as is stated in national regulations based on the Euratom Directive on Nuclear Safety and the IAEA safety fundamentals. In this context the PSR, a self-assessment performed by the licensee with results to be reported to the RB, is an important instrument to continuously improve safety.
It is the responsibility of the RB to independently verify if the PSR is in line with the national regulations and IAEA guidance (SSG-25). According to national regulations, this is usually done as part of the regular oversight activities of the RB and in general there is no public participation in oversight activities. However, in some countries the possibility exists for the public to reach out to the RB with comments or enforcement suggestions based on the PSR information provided by the licensee and/or the RB.
Regulatory framework
The regulatory framework in which the PSR is included differs from country to country. Thus, the purpose of the PSR and the way the PSR is implemented in the national regulatory frameworks can be diverse:
- As a systematic safety assessment carried out at regular intervals
- In support of the decision-making process for licence renewal
- In support of the decision-making process in relation with long term operation
The PSR is complementary to both the continuous assessments of safety performed by the licensee and the continuous oversight conducted by the RB. The different purposes of the PSR lead to significant differences in outcome when it comes to assessing whether the RB’s review of the PSR shall be seen as a decision of the RB or as a regulatory review in the context of regulatory oversight. The implementation of the improvement measures following a PSR or any licensing procedures following from a regulatory review of a PSR, however, are not part of the PSR process itself.
Public participation
As regulatory bodies, we all recognize the importance of public participation, and have it implemented in decision-making procedures which determine licensing conditions. This is done in different ways, following the boundary conditions of different national regulatory and legal frameworks.
PSR being a technical assessment process carried out by the licensee, it does not by itself entail public participation.
In cases where the conclusions of a PSR are used as an input to a regulatory decision-making process, these conclusions can constitute relevant information for public participation. In this case the criteria and provisions for public participation are those of the associated regulatory procedure.
However, in cases where the results of a PSR do not lead to a subsequent regulatory decision-making process, the results are reviewed by the RB as part of regular oversight, according to national regulations.
Introducing public participation into regular oversight, specifically into the process of the regulatory review of the PSR in general, may lead to a change in the nature and purpose of the PSR as described for instance in IAEA SSG-25. The licensee is primarily responsible for nuclear safety of the power plant and therefore should remain fully responsible for the PSR. It is thus paramount to maintain a clear distinction between the respective responsibilities of the licensee and the RB, obligations regarding public participation only concerning the decision-making process of the latter.
